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Abstract
We give an exponential separation between one-way quantum and classical communication complexity
for a Boolean function. Earlier such a separation was known only for a relation. A very similar result
was obtained earlier but independently by Kerenidis and Raz [KR06]. Our version of the result gives
an example in the bounded storage model of cryptography, where the key is secure if the adversary has
a certain amount of classical storage, but is completely insecure if he has a similar amount of quantum
storage.
1 Introduction
From a computer science perspective, the main theoretical goal of the field of quantum computing is to
exhibit problems where quantum computers are much faster (or otherwise better) than classical computers.
Preferably exponentially better. The most famous example, Shor’s efficient quantum factoring algorithm,
constitutes a separation only if one is willing to believe that efficient factoring is impossible on a classical
computer—proving this would of course imply that P 6=NP. One of the few areas where we can establish
unconditional exponential separations is the area of communication complexity. Here two parties, Alice with
input x and Bob with input y, collaborate to solve some computational problem that depends on both x
and y. They want to do this with minimal communication.
Examples of communication problems where quantum communication gives exponential savings over
classical communication were for instance given by Buhrman, Cleve, and Wigderson [BCW98] for zero-error
protocols, Raz [Raz99] for bounded-error protocols, Buhrman, Cleve, Watrous, and de Wolf [BCWW01]
for simultaneous message passing protocols, and Bar-Yossef, Jayram, and Kerenidis [BJK04] for one-way
protocols. The last result establishes an exponential separation for one-way communication: it describes a
problem (the Hidden Matching Problem) which can be solved by a quantum message of logn qubits, but
which cannot be solved with good success probability with much fewer than
√
n classical bits of communi-
cation. However, their problem is a relational problem, where for each x and y many possible outputs are
considered correct. Establishing a separation for a Boolean function was left as an open problem.
In this paper, we give an exponential ((log n)3/2 vs
√
n(log n)1/4) quantum-classical separation for one-
way communication for a Boolean function. The problem is a variant of a functional problem that was
already conjectured to give such a separation by Bar-Yossef et al. As usual in such results, the efficient
quantum protocol is quite easy, while the lower bound for classical one-way protocols is harder to show. A
very similar separation was obtained earlier but independently by Kerenidis and Raz [KR06] using different
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techniques based on Fourier analysis. The outline of their proof was obtained in the summer of 2004, but
was written up in detail when they learned in June 2006 about our independent work (which was not quite
finished at the time). We thank Kerenidis and Raz for generously delaying the publication of their proof
while we were finishing ours.
Let us briefly point out some differences between our two proofs. The Kerenidis-Raz result is a slightly
stronger separation than ours, since the quantum upper bound for their problem is logn while ours is
(logn)3/2. Their proof is heavily based on the analysis of Fourier coefficients. It is self-contained except
for an application of the Bonami-Beckner inequality. Our proof is quite different. Intuitively, it shows
that if Alice’s message was too short, then Bob has hardly any information about a certain string z that
can be computed from x given also Bob’s input. It is based on a result of Talagrand [Tal96] and a large
deviation inequality for martingales due to McDiarmid [McD98]. A small advantage of our result is that our
quantum protocol has zero-error, while the Kerenidis-Raz variant of the problem gives a separation between
bounded-error quantum and classical, but not between zero-error quantum and bounded-error classical.
Another advantage of our proof is that it shows something interesting about the bounded storage model
of cryptography. In this model, introduced by Maurer [Mau92], an adversary has full but temporary access
to some string x but can only store a limited amount of information about x. A and B have a secret key K
available, which they use to derive a common string z from x (they only need to store small portions of x at
the time). This string z is supposed to be almost completely uniformly distributed from the point of view of
the adversary, and hence can be used by A and B as a key in a one-time pad communication scheme. The
power of this model is that one can show in many cases that the adversary knows very little about the string
z that Alice and Bob derived from x, even if the adversary later learns the shared key that was used to derive
z [ADR02, DM04]. Viewing our communication result in the bounded-storage context, Alice’s message is
the storage of the adversary, while Bob’s input takes the role of the secret key K. Our result shows that z
can fairly safely be used as a key if the adversary has less than
√
n classical storage, while it is completely
insecure if the adversary has
√
n (or even only polylogarithmic) quantum storage.1
Finally, let us point out that both results can be modified to give a separation in the simultaneous
message passing model between the models of classical communication with shared entanglement and clas-
sical communication with shared randomness. Earlier, such a separation was known only for a relational
problem [GKRW06], not for a Boolean function.
2 The problem and its quantum and classical upper bounds
We assume basic knowledge of quantum computation [NC00] and (quantum) communication complex-
ity [KN97, Wol02]. The partial Boolean function that will give the separation is the following problem,
parametrized by a value α ≤ 1/4. It’s a modification of the Boolean Hidden Matching Problem from [BJK04].
Alice: x ∈ {0, 1}n
Bob: αn disjoint edges e1 = (i1, j1), . . . , eαn = (iαn, jαn) from
(
[n]
2
)
and a string w ∈ {0, 1}αn
Define zℓ = xiℓ ⊕ xjℓ and z = z1 . . . zαn
Promise: w = z ⊕ bαn for a bit b
Function value: b
There is an easy O(log(n)/α)-qubit protocol for this problem that gives the correct output with proba-
bility 1/2 and claims ignorance otherwise, as follows. Given a uniform superposition over all bits of x (which
takes logn qubits), Bob can complete his αn edges to a perfect matching and measure with the corresponding
set of n/2 2-dimensional projectors. With probability 2α he will get one of the edges eℓ = (iℓ, jℓ) of his input.
The state will then collapse to (−1)xiℓ |iℓ〉 + (−1)xjℓ |jℓ〉, from which Bob can obtain the bit zℓ = xiℓ ⊕ xjℓ
with certainty. XORing this bit with the corresponding bit wℓ in his string w gives the function value b. The
protocol gives Bob O(1/α) copies of the logn-qubit state, so he learns b with good probability (and knows
when he doesn’t).
1In a way our result can be viewed as a strong extractor, albeit a rather bad one, where the random seed (the sequence of
edges of Bob’s input, described below) takes about n bits.
2
The following is an easy classical upper bound. Suppose Alice uniformly picks a subset of d ≈
√
n/α of
the bits of x and sends those to Bob. It is easy to see by the birthday paradox that now with high probability
Bob will have both endpoints of at least one of his αn edges. This enables him to compute the function
value b. To send a uniform subset of d bits from x, Alice would need to send about d logn bits to Bob, since
she needs to describe the d indices as well as their bitvalues. However, by Newman’s theorem [New91], Alice
can actually restrict her random choice to picking one out of O(n) possible d-bit subsets, instead of one out
of all
(
n
d
)
possible subsets. Hence d+O(log n) bits of communication suffice.
In the sections below we show that this classical upper bound is essentially optimal for α ≈ 1/√logn,
which gives the exponential quantum-classical separation.
3 Strategy of the proof
We prove a lower bound on classical communication with shared randomness for the problem of the previous
section. By the Yao principle, it suffices to prove a lower bound for deterministic protocols under the uniform
input distribution on the x’s, the edges, and b (note that this fixes Bob’s second input w). Suppose we have
a classical deterministic one-way protocol with c bits of communication and error probability at most 1/10
under this distribution. This protocol partitions the set of 2n x’s into 2c sets A1, . . . , A2c , one for each
possible message. At least half of the x’s must occur in sets of size at least 2n−c−1, since the smaller sets
together contain fewer than 2c · 2n−c−1 = 2n−1 x’s. Hence there must be at least one set A that contains at
least 2n−c−1 x’s and has error at most 1/5, otherwise the overall error would be larger than 1/10. Hereafter
we will analyze this set A.
From Bob’s point of view the following happens when he receives the message corresponding to A: αn
disjoint edges (iℓ, jℓ), ℓ ∈ [αn], uniformly picked from
(
[n]
2
)
are given, and an unknown x is picked uniformly
from A. As before, let zℓ = xiℓ ⊕ xjℓ and z = z1 . . . zαn. Bob needs to figure out whether his second input
equals z ⊕ 0n/4 or z ⊕ 1n/4. We will use capital letters to denote the corresponding random variables. Our
goal here is to show that Z is close to uniformly distributed when the edges are known but x is not. Suppose
we can show that if the communication c is “small”, then Z is more or less uniform: the total variation
distance is d(Z,Uαn) =
1
2
∑
z∈{0,1}αn |Pr[Z = z]− 2−αn| ≤ δ for some small δ (this is the bulk of the proof
below).2 Then also d(Z ⊕ 0αn, Uαn) ≤ δ and d(Z ⊕ 1αn, Uαn) ≤ δ, and hence by the triangle inequality
d(Z ⊕ 0αn, Z ⊕ 1αn) ≤ d(Z ⊕ 0αn, Uαn) + d(Z ⊕ 1αn, Uαn) ≤ 2δ.
But distinguishing between the two distributions Z ⊕ 0αn and Z ⊕ 1αn is exactly what Bob needs to do to
determine b. It is well known that distinguishing between two distributions with variation distance 2δ can
be done with probability at most 1/2 + δ. Accordingly, if c is “small” then the success probability will be
close to 1/2. Conversely, since Bob’s success probability on the set A is at least 4/5, c must have been large.
4 How biased are the bits of Z?
We will analyze the distribution of Z, which depends on the known edges e1 = (i1, j1), . . . , eαn = (iαn, jαn)
as well as the unknown x ∈ A. Intuitively, if c is small (i.e. A is large), for most strings z ∈ {0, 1}n we should
have Pr[Z = z] ≈ 2−αn and hence d(Z,Uαn) is small. Proving this will be quite technical.
We view the edges as being picked one by one. Since A is quite large, for most (i, j)-pairs roughly equally
many x’s should have xi⊕xj = 1 as have xi⊕xj = 0. Thus we expect the first bit Z1 to be close to uniformly
distributed when x is picked uniformly from A. Similarly, we would like the later bits Zℓ to be more or less
uniform when conditioned on values Z1 = z1, . . . , Zℓ−1 = zℓ−1 for the earlier edges. More formally, once
(i1, j1), . . . , (iℓ−1, jℓ−1) and z1, . . . , zℓ−1 have been fixed, we define the “ℓth bias” by
βℓ = Pr
x∈A
[Zℓ = 1 | Z1 = z1, . . . , Zℓ−1 = zℓ−1]− 1/2.
2Note that we include a factor of 1/2 in our definition of total variation distance. This means that the distance lies in the
interval [0, 1], and if distributions P and Q have distance δ, the probability of any event cannot change by more than δ, i.e.,
|PrP [E]− PrQ[E]| ≤ δ for any event E.
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This is a random variable, depending on the choice of (iℓ, jℓ). It is positive if Zℓ is biased towards 1, and
negative if Zℓ is biased towards 0.
Fixing the first ℓ − 1 edges and conditioning on their bitvalues Z1 = z1, . . . , Zℓ−1 = zℓ−1 will shrink the
set of possible x’s. Let Aℓ be the subset of A that is still consistent. Initially we have |A1| = |A| ≥ 2n−c−1.
When we pick the next edge (iℓ, jℓ) and its value zℓ, the new set Aℓ+1 will be smaller by a factor 1/2 + βℓ
if zℓ = 1 and by a factor 1/2− βℓ if zℓ = 0. Hence we expect the set to shrink by a factor of about two for
each new edge and bitvalue for that edge, i.e., |Aℓ| ≥ 2n−c−ℓ. We have
|Aℓ| = |A| · Pr[Z1 = z1, . . . , Zℓ−1 = zℓ−1] = |A| ·
ℓ−1∏
i=1
(1/2− (−1)ziβi) ,
and in particular
Pr[Z = z] =
αn∏
ℓ=1
Pr[Zℓ = zℓ | Z1 = z1, . . . , Zℓ−1 = zℓ−1] =
αn∏
ℓ=1
(1/2− (−1)zℓβℓ) = |Aαn+1||A| .
Hence showing that Z is close to uniformly distributed is equivalent to showing that |Aαn+1|/|A| ≈ 2−αn
with high probability.
We use a result of Talagrand [Tal96] to relate the expected squared bias β2ℓ to the size of the set Aℓ.
Lemma 1 ([Tal96], Eq. (2.9)) There is an absolute constant K ≥ 1 such that for all A ⊆ {0, 1}n
∑
i,j∈[n],i6=j
β2ij ≤ K
(
log
K2n
|A|
)2
,
where βij = Ex∈A[xi ⊕ xj − 1/2].
This will allow us to establish a bound showing that βℓ is probably quite small if the set Aℓ hasn’t shrunk
too fast. We allow some more shrinking than we expect: note the ‘3c’ instead of ‘c’ in the exponent below.
Corollary 2 There is an absolute constant γ > 0 such that if |Aℓ| ≥ 2n−3c−ℓ, then
(1) E[β2ℓ ] ≤ γ(c/n)2 and (2) Pr[|βℓ| ≥ ε] ≤ γ( cnε )2.
Proof. Note that fixing a bitvalue for the parity of an edge means that the two bits in that edge behave as
one bit. Accordingly, we can view the set Aℓ as a set of strings of length m = n− (ℓ− 1) bits. We can upper
bound the sum of biases over all possible new edges (excluding ones touching earlier edges) by the sum over
all possible edges (including ones touching earlier edges):∑
iℓjℓ 6∈{i1,...,iℓ−1,j1,...,jℓ−1}
β2iℓ,jℓ ≤
∑
i,j∈[m],i6=j
β2ij ≤ O(c2),
where the last inequality is by applying Lemma 1 to Aℓ. Dividing by the number
(
n−2(ℓ−1)
2
)
= Θ(n2) of
possible new edges proves part (1). Part (2) now follows from Chebyshev’s inequality. ✷
There is a threat of circularity in our proof. On the one hand we need to assume that the sets Aℓ are
not too small in order to show that the biases βℓ are not too large (via Corollary 2). But on the other hand
we need to show that the biases are not too large in order to be able to conclude that Aℓ is not too small.
To deal with this problem, below we give a proof in two “passes”. The first pass is quite coarse-grained and
shows that (with high probability) the sets Aℓ won’t shrink by a factor of 2
−2c more than what we expect.
This allows us to apply Corollary 2 to each of the αn biases during the second pass. In this second, more
fine-grained pass we actually show that d(Z,Uαn) is small.
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5 First pass: The sets Aℓ probably don’t shrink too much
We can only use Corollary 2 if the condition |Aℓ| ≥ 2n−3c−ℓ is satisfied. We now show that with high
probability this is indeed the case for each ℓ simultaneously. The proof uses the following concentration
result from [McD98].
Lemma 3 ([McD98], special case of Thm. 3.7) Let S1, . . . , Sk be bounded random variables satisfying
E[Sj|S1 = s1, . . . , Sj−1 = sj−1] = 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k and all values s1, . . . , sk. Then for all t, v ≥ 0
Pr

 k∑
j=1
Sj ≥ t

 ≤ e−t2/2v + Pr

 k∑
j=1
S2j ≥ v

 .
Lemma 4 There is a constant δ0 > 0 such that for all 0 < δ ≤ δ0, if α = δ2/(4
√
lnn) and c = δ
√
n(lnn)1/4
then with probability 99/100 over all choices of e1, . . . , eαn and z = z1, . . . , zαn the following holds: for each
ℓ ∈ [αn] we have |Aℓ| ≥ 2n−3c−ℓ and |βℓ| ≤ 1/4.
Proof. Note that
|Aℓ| = |A| · Pr[Z1 = z1, . . . , Zℓ−1 = zℓ−1] = |A| ·
ℓ−1∏
i=1
(1/2− (−1)ziβi) ≥ 2n−c−ℓ
ℓ−1∏
i=1
(1− (−1)zi2βi) .
Define Si = −(−1)zi2βi. For the lower bound on Aℓ it thus suffices to lower bound
∏ℓ−1
i=1 (1 + Si) by 2
−2c.
Taking logarithms, we need to show for each ℓ
ℓ−1∑
i=1
log(1 + Si) ≥ −2c. (1)
Let us divide the αn ℓs into blocks of size c, i.e., for 1 ≤ k ≤ αn/c define the kth block Bk = {(k − 1)c +
1, . . . , kc} (we ignore rounding for simplicity). Let Ek be the following event:
(a) |βi| ≤ 1/4 for each i ∈ Bk and
(b)
∑
i∈Bk log(1 + Si) ≥ −c2/αn.
We will show below in Claim 5 that for all k, Pr[¬Ek | E1, . . . , Ek−1] ≤ c/100αn. This implies
Pr[¬(E1, . . . , Eαn/c)] ≤
αn/c∑
k=1
Pr[¬Ek | E1, . . . , Ek−1] ≤ αn
c
· c
100αn
=
1
100
.
If E1, . . . , Eαn/c all hold, then from (b) for all k we have
∑k·c
i=1 log(1+Si) ≥ −k ·c2/αn ≥ −c and in particular
Eq. (1) holds whenever ℓ− 1 is a multiple of c. For the other ℓ pick k such that ℓ− 1 ∈ Bk+1 and note that
thanks to (a) we have log(1 + Si) ≥ log(1 − 2(1/4)) = −1 and hence
ℓ−1∑
i=1
log(1 + Si) =
kc∑
i=1
log(1 + Si) +
ℓ−1∑
i=kc+1
log(1 + Si) ≥ −c+
ℓ−1∑
i=kc+1
−1 ≥ −2c.
Claim 5 For all 1 ≤ k ≤ αn/c, we have Pr[¬Ek | E1, . . . , Ek−1] ≤ c/100αn.
Proof. Let ℓ1 = (k − 1)c be the last index in Bk−1 and condition on E1, . . . , Ek−1. This means that
|Aℓ1+1| ≥ 2n−2c−ℓ1−1. Let Fi denote the event that (a) holds for i ∈ Bk, i.e., |βi| ≤ 1/4. We want
to show Pr[¬Fi | F1, . . . , Fi−1] ≤ 1/500αn for i ∈ Bk. This will imply that (a) fails to hold only with
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probability at most c/500αn. If |βℓ1+1|, . . . , |βℓ1+i−1| ≤ 1/4 then as before
∑i−1
j=ℓ1+1
log(1 + Sj) ≥ −c and
hence |Aℓ1+i| ≥ |Aℓ1+1| · 2−i−c ≥ 2n−3c−(ℓ1+i). We can now apply Corollary 2(part 2) to show
Pr[|βℓ1+i| > 1/4] ≤ γ
(
4c
n
)2
= 16γδ2
√
lnn
n
≤ 1
500αn
,
where we use α = δ2/(4
√
lnn) and c = δ
√
n(lnn)1/4 and choose δ0 small enough.
Now, assuming (a) holds for each i ∈ Bk and hence the conditions of Corollary 2 hold for each i ∈ Bk,
we will show that (b) holds for Bk with probability at least 1− 4c/500αn, which will imply the claim.
Note that log(1 + Si) ≥ Si − 2S2i if |βi| ≤ 1/4 and hence∑
i∈Bk
log(1 + Si) ≥
∑
i∈Bk
Si − 2
∑
i∈Bk
S2i =
∑
i∈Bk
Si − 8
∑
i∈Bk
β2i . (2)
We first bound the second term of the righthand side. Corollary 2 implies
E
[∑
i∈Bk
β2i
]
≤ c · γ(c/n)2 = γc3/n2.
Let v = c2/2αn; this is half of what (b) allows us to lose. By Markov’s inequality
Pr
[
8
∑
i∈Bk
β2i > v
]
≤ 16αγc/n ≤ c/500αn
for sufficiently large n.
Now for the first term in the righthand side of Eq. (2). Conditioning on event (a) changes the (a priory
uniform) distribution on the zi for the i ∈ Bk by at most c/500αn in total variation distance. This means
that if we bound Pr[
∑
i∈Bk Si ≤ −v] under the assumption that the zi are uniform, the true probability will
change by at most c/500αn (see footnote 2). If the zi are uniform then the condition of Lemma 3 holds
for each Si: the conditional expectations are all 0, because the sign of Si is + or − with equal probability.
Recall that S2i = 4β
2
i and v = c
2/2αn. Hence by Lemma 3 (with t = v), if the zi are uniform
Pr
[∑
i∈Bk
Si < −v
]
≤ e−v/2 + Pr
[
4
∑
i∈Bk
β2i ≥ v
]
≤ 1/n+ c/500αn ≤ 2c/500αn.
Putting everything together we upper bound the probability that (b) fails for the kth block:
Pr
[∑
i∈Bk
log(1 + Si) < −c2/αn = −2v
]
≤ Pr
[∑
i∈Bk
Si < −v
]
+ Pr
[
8
∑
i∈Bk
β2i > v
]
≤ 4c/500αn.
This concludes the proof of Claim 5. ✷
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4. ✷
6 Second pass: Z is close to uniform
We now prove the main result, which implies the Ω˜(n1/2) lower bound on classical one-way communication.
Theorem 6 There is a constant δ > 0 such that if c = δ
√
n(lnn)1/4 and α = δ
2
4
√
lnn
, then d(Z,Uαn) ≤ 1/10.
6
Of course this theorem also holds if the communication of the classical protocol is c < δn1/2(lnn)1/4,
since we can always add dummy bits to a shorter message to make its length equal to exactly that value.
Proof. We rewrite the total variation distance:
d(Z,Uαn) =
1
2
∑
z∈{0,1}αn
∣∣Pr[Z = z]− 2−αn∣∣
=
1
2
2−αn
∑
z∈{0,1}αn
∣∣∣∣∣
αn∏
ℓ=1
(1− (−1)zℓ2βℓ)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
Ez
[∣∣∣∣∣
αn∏
ℓ=1
(1 − (−1)zℓ2βℓ)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
]
,
where Ez denotes the expectation over uniform z. By Lemma 4, with probability 99/100, for each ℓ ∈ [αn]
we have |Aℓ| ≥ 2n−3c−ℓ and |βℓ| ≤ 1/4. Let us call this event E. Then
d(Z,Uαn) ≤ Pr[E] · d(Z|E , Uαn) + Pr[¬E] · d(Z|¬E , Uαn) ≤ 99
100
· d(Z|E , Uαn) + 1
100
.
Note that conditioning on E will change the (a priori uniform) distribution on the z. However, the total
variation distance between the conditioned distribution z|E of the z and the uniform distribution is at most
1/100, since the event E on which it is conditioned has probability at least 99/100. Hence
d(Z|E , Uαn) = Ez|E
[∣∣∣∣∣
αn∏
ℓ=1
(1 − (−1)zℓ2βℓ)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ Ez
[∣∣∣∣∣
αn∏
ℓ=1
(1− (−1)zℓ2βℓ)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
]
+ 1/100
= Ez
[∣∣∣2∑αnℓ=1 log(1+Sℓ) − 1∣∣∣]+ 1/100,
where Sℓ = −(−1)zℓ2βℓ as in the previous section. We thus need to show that
∑αn
ℓ=1 log(1 + Sℓ) is usually
very close to 0. When conditioned on event E we have |βℓ| ≤ 1/4 and hence
Sℓ
ln 2
≥ log(1 + Sℓ) ≥ Sℓ − 2S2ℓ .
It thus suffices to show that with high probability, both |∑αnℓ=1 Sℓ| and∑αnℓ=1 S2ℓ are small. This can be done
in the same way as in the proof of Claim 5, using this time that E[
∑αn
ℓ=1 βℓ] ≤ γαc2/n = o(1). ✷
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